Moral hazard and adverse selection impede the development of formal crop insurance markets in developing countries. Besides, the risk mitigation provided by informal risk-sharing arrangements is restricted by their inability to protect against covariate shocks. In this context, index-based insurance is seen as a promising scheme as it is immune to moral hazard and adverse selection and may o¤er e¤ective protection against covariate shocks. It would thus seem that the two institutions are ideal complements.
Introduction
The near absence of formal crop insurance markets implies that rural households in many developing countries depend primarily on their own, potentially costly, autarkic strategies for income and consumption smoothing and the strength of their informal risk sharing networks to mitigate the myriad sources of risk they face (Rosenzweig & Binswanger (1993) ; Townsend (1994) ; Morduch (1995) ; Ligon et al. (2002) ). This bleak risk management landscape for agricultural households may be changing thanks to the recent re-discovery of index insurance by researchers and development institutions. The indemnity in an index insurance contract is based on an external index, such as rainfall, directly measured average yield, or satellite-based predictions of average yield, which is correlated with the individual insured farmer's yield, but independent of his/her isolated action and behavior. As such, the contracts are relatively immune to both the moral hazard and adverse selection problems that plague conventional, named peril contracts. This conceptual promise has spurred a number of research initiatives that explore the optimal design of index contracts and put in place and evaluate pilot index insurance initiatives (Barnett et al. (2008) ; Miranda & Farrin (2012) ). The jury is still out on index insurance as signi…cant challenges -including high basis risk, low farmer …nancial literacy, and high coordination costs across insurers, re-insurers and regulators -remain unresolved. If, however, these pilot projects are deemed successful and scaled-up, rural households in developing countries may enjoy expanded access to formal insurance markets via index insurance.
The goal of this paper is to consider how this expansion of formal crop insurance may play out. Speci…cally, we develop a theoretical model that explores how the introduction of a formal index insurance market may a¤ect farmers' risk taking behavior and the degree of risk sharing in existing informal risk sharing arrangements (IRSAs). At …rst glance, the separate risk domains of the two types of institutions suggest that IRSAs will not be a¤ected, leading to unambiguously positive e¢ ciency and welfare impacts. IRSAs are information intensive and thus tend to be limited to spatially concentrated areas, such as a village.
As such, IRSAs are best suited to mitigate idiosyncratic risks, such as those deriving from health or plotspeci…c pest problems that are relatively independent across households within the village. In contrast, index insurance contracts are aimed at mitigating covariate shocks, such as yield declines due to drought, that tend to simultaneously a¤ect all households in a village. By removing the covariate risk that IRSAs are unable to address, index insurance would appear to unambiguously increase households'risk bearing capacity, leading to greater investment and welfare.
Closer consideration of the incentives embedded in IRSAs, however, reveals that this win-win scenario need not obtain. We show that when the level of risk-taking is not contractible by members of the IRSA, the introduction of formal index insurance to individuals will reduce informal risk sharing (crowding out) and can also, under conditions we lay out, reduce risk taking and welfare. The adverse welfare impact of index-insurance is reversed if the index insurance contract is instead o¤ered at the group level.
To understand the intuition behind the crowding out result, we must turn to the tradeo¤ that exists between incentives and risk sharing within IRSAs of …nite size when risk-taking is not contractible. If IRSAs were in…nitely large, then members would be able to completely eliminate idiosyncratic risk through full risk pooling, and no tradeo¤s would exist. In the real world, however, IRSAs are …nite; they are limited to the number of households in a village or the individuals in a household's extended family. As such, even if members fully pool their idiosyncratic risk, the average realization of the idiosyncratic shock across network members in a given year need not be zero. As a result, IRSA members confront "residual" idiosyncratic risk. If risk taking is not contractible among members of the IRSA, then this residual idiosyncratic risk becomes a vector of externalities; as I increase my risk taking, I increase the variance of this residual risk and impose a negative externality on others in the group. Informal risk-sharing therefore entails a form of moral hazard 1 , which gives rise to excessive risk-taking in equilibrium. To mitigate the adverse consequences of moral hazard, the group …nds it optimal to adopt an incomplete rate of risk-sharing. This rate is second best as there is a tradeo¤ between insurance against idiosyncratic risk and excessive risk-taking.
The introduction of index insurance may thus have unintended, adverse consequences as the reduction of covariate risk provides incentives for individuals to increase their risk taking. In order to mitigate the ensuing higher residual idiosyncratic risk, the IRSA may endogenously choose to reduce the amount of idiosyncratic risk pooling, thus providing a counter-incentive in order to decrease risk taking. Our model is thus similar in spirit to that of Arnott & Stiglitz (1991) who show that formal insurers will ration insurance in order to maintain agents' incentives. We then study group-based index insurance contracts and show that they dominate individual-based contracts because groups internalize the adverse e¤ects that index-insurance may have on moral hazard.
To our knowledge, Arnott & Stiglitz (1991) were the …rst to examine the coexistence of formal and informal
insurance. In a model with moral hazard, they show that the equilibrium in a competitive formal market entails rationing; individuals are willing to pay for additional coverage but insurers are not willing to provide it because the additional risk taking it would induce would reduce the insurer's pro…ts. The introduction of informal risk-sharing is then shown to crowd out formal insurance. If informal risk-sharing also su¤ers from moral hazard, then the crowding out e¤ect unambiguously reduces welfare in their model, because the market is more e¤ective than a group of reduced size in absorbing shocks.
The standpoint we adopt in this paper is the opposite as we explore the impact of index-insurance on pre-existing informal risk-sharing. However, our model is not simply a reversed version of Arnott & Stiglitz (1991) 's analysis. While they consider a single source of idiosyncratic risk insurable by both formal
and informal contracts, we analyze a context more representative of rural areas in developing countries in which households face both idiosyncratic and covariate risks. Moreover, the formal contract we consider, index-insurance, provides protection against covariate risk only, while IRSA's only provide protection against idiosyncratic risk. Hence, the crowding out result we highlight in this paper does not result from the same mechanism. Attanasio & Rios-Rull (2000) study the impact of compulsory insurance against covariate risk on informal risk-sharing when the latter is impeded by limited commitment. They show that formal insurance crowds out informal risk-sharing and may lead to welfare losses under conditions they lay out. The main di¤erence with our model is that we do not consider ex-post enforceability problems regarding informal transfers; we instead focus on the role played by ex-ante moral hazard. Furthermore, index-insurance is generally not publicly provided and hence not compulsory. Therefore, we analyze demand for index-insurance under both individual and group subscription cases.
Several recent papers analyze the interaction between formal index-insurance and informal risk-sharing.
1 In this paper, we follow Delpierre et al. (2014) in the way the terms moral hazard are used. According to this interpretation, moral hazard refers to the following phenomenon: Risk-sharing entails externalities of risk, which induce agents to adopt risky production choices as they do not support the entire cost of their choice in terms of risk bearing. The classical interpretation of moral hazard in insurance problems involves a costly action that agents can take to reduce the probability of incurring a loss.
In this paper, e¤ort takes the form of reduced expected returns as explained below. A discussion of the distinction between this form of moral hazard and the standard one is available in Delpierre et al. (2014). potentially exists between the two forms of insurance. Their theoretical contributions are based on a the following intuition. Due to the imperfect correlation between the index and a farmer's individual income, farmers face basis risk: they may su¤er an idiosyncratic loss not captured by the index and thus not covered by the formal index insurance contract. In those states of the world, the payment of the index insurance premium generates a high marginal disutility. As informal risk-sharing reduces either the extent or the probability of occurrence of large idiosyncratic losses, it should mitigate basis risk. A farmer's willingness to pay for index-insurance should then be higher if he/she is involved in informal groups, which aim at sharing idiosyncratic risk. This prediction is tested and con…rmed by Mobarak & Rosenzweig (2012) on sub-castes in India. Dercon et al. (2014) conducted experiments among funeral insurance groups in Ethiopia.
They exposed group leaders to trainings on index-insurance. The treatment consisted of training sessions that highlighted the potential complementarity between index-insurance and informal risk-sharing, while the basic training was strictly focused on index-insurance per se. They show that agents who express an interest for index-insurance are signi…cantly more engaged in risk-sharing in the treatment group.
By identifying (or creating) exogenous variation in the level of informal risk sharing, both Mobarak & Rosenzweig (2012) and Dercon et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence that IRSA's can crowd-in the demand for index insurance. This uni-directional focus comes at a cost, however, as it prevents a full exporation of the potential interactions between the two forms of insurance. For example, Dercon et al. (2014) show that, at the level of an individual, the marginal utility of index-insurance is higher when the rate of informal risk-sharing is high. This result can be turned around, however, implying that the marginal utility of informal risk-sharing is higher for someone who has purchased index-insurance. As we will show, this does not, however, imply that index-insurance crowds-in informal risk-sharing in the sense that it would increase the rate of risk-sharing. In the theoretical models of both above-mentioned papers, risk-sharing is exogenously given so that, by construction, they cannot predict how the equilibrium level of risk-sharing is impacted by the introduction of index-insurance. Moreover, the rate of informal risk-sharing does not simply result from isolated individual decisions, but is the outcome of joint decisions taken by IRSA members. Hence, it is not straightforward that the technological complementarity between IRSAs and index-insurance highlighted by Dercon et al. (2014) and Mobarak & Rosenzweig (2012) will give rise to a crowding in e¤ect in equilibrium.
Our paper analyzes the interaction between index-insurance and IRSAs while allowing the rate of risksharing, which is decided at the group level, to vary following the introduction of index-insurance. Moreover, we treat the level of risk taking of individuals in the IRSA as endogenous and show that the ensuing moral hazard problem prevents the complementarity at the individual level from generating a crowding in e¤ect at the group level. Further, if the rate of risk sharing is cooperatively set at the group level by the IRSA, but risk taking decisions are non-cooperatively taken by each individual, then the technological complementarity between informal risk-sharing and index-insurance may result in a crowding out e¤ect at the group level.
de Janvry et al. (2014) also model the demand for index-insurance by members of formal or informal groups, such as producers' cooperatives or risk-sharing networks. Depending on the type of activity undertaken by the group, they show that either free riding or coordination issues may reduce demand for index-insurance. Their model is very general as it only relies on the assumption that agents' interactions within the group make their utility depend not only on their own wealth but on the entire vector of individual wealth levels in the group. In particular, they argue that informal risk sharing creates a substitution e¤ect between an individual's (random) wealth and the aggregate level of wealth in the group, because a negative individual shock is o¤set more via transfers from other group members when aggregate wealth is higher.
An individual's purchase of index insurance would then simultaneously reduce the variability of own wealth and of aggregate wealth, thereby increasing the utility of other group members and resulting in a classic free-riding problem.
As compared to de Janvry et al. (2014)'s paper, the contribution of our model consists in providing more structure to the IRSA in order to capture the mechanism by which index-insurance and IRSAs interact. This paper is not a particular case of de Janvry et al. (2014)'s model for two reasons. First, our model does not reproduce the positive externality because we assume that only idiosyncratic risks, not income, are shared.
As a result, an individual's utility depends on own wealth, or income, and on the aggregate idiosyncratic shock but not on aggregate income. Hence, individual bene…ts from index-insurance, namely the reduction of the covariate risk, are not transmitted to the group. Our assumption of idiosyncratic risk-sharing means that shocks are shared but not income per se. This assumption is appropriate since income sharing violates actuarial fairness and is hence incompatible with the observation that IRSAs satisfy strict reciprocity rules (Platteau (1997) , Ligon et al. (2002) ). In addition, since the primary purpose of IRSAs is to insure its members against speci…c risks that are uncorrelated between agents (Platteau (1997) , Dercon et al. (2006 ), it makes sense to assume that only idiosyncratic (and not covariate) shocks are shared. In this case, the positive externality à la de Janvry et al. (2014) would not appear since it relies on a positive impact of an individual covariate risk reduction on the wellbeing of others.
Our second contribution relative to de Janvry et al. (2014)'s paper is an explicit analysis of IRSAs with endogenous risk-taking behaviors. As already stressed, index-insurance and IRSAs deal with separate risk domains, so that informal risk-sharing may not provide a direct vector of externalities from an individual's index-insurance purchase to the welfare of others in the group. Instead, we show that the impact of indexinsurance on IRSAs can result from changes in incentives and behaviors.
Although the mechanism of interaction between the two types of insurance is di¤erent, the policy and contract design recommendations that emerge from our model are quite similar to those of Dercon et al. (2014) and de Janvry et al. (2014) . Indeed, we would also recommend that index-insurance be o¤ered to informal insurance groups, since the latter internalize the moral hazard issue highlighted in this paper. This idea is also empirically supported by Vasilaky et al. (2014) who conduct behavioral experiments with farmers in the Dominican Republics and show that group contracts induce a higher uptake rate for index insurance than individual contracts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our assumptions about technology, risk and risk preferences and characterizes the …rst best level of risk taking. Section 3 introduces the institutional setup of the IRSA, in which members set the fraction of their idiosyncratic risk that they pool with others. We assume that the level of risk sharing is costlessly enforceable and characterize its equilibrium value. In contrast, we assume individual risk taking behavior is not contractible within the IRSA and, as described above, this will be the source of moral hazard. We show that for any given level of risk pooling, the equilibrium level of risk taking will be too high relative to the cooperative level. The second main result of Section 3 immediately follows; namely that in order to address the negative risk taking externality, the group will optimally choose incomplete sharing of idiosyncratic risk. Section 4 introduces a stylized index insurance contract in which the farmer chooses the level of coverage. The coverage level, in turn, is calibrated relative to the farmer's level of risk taking so that full coverage, i.e., coverage equal to risk taking, provides full insurance against covariate risk. Section 4 concludes by characterizing index insurance demand. Section 5 delivers the main results of the paper, namely the impact of the introduction of index insurance on informal risk sharing, individual risk taking and welfare under individual versus group subscription to index insurance. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of limitations to and potential extensions of the model and some re ‡ections on the optimal design of index insurance contracts in developing countries.
2 Technology, preferences and the risk environment
We consider a group of farmers belonging to the same community or cooperative with n members, N = f1; :::ng. We assume that group members are homogeneous in terms of technology, endowment and preferences. We begin by describing the technology and the risk environment. An individual farmer's income is stochastic and takes the following form:
where 2 R + is the level of risk-taking chosen by the farmer and corresponds, loosely, to the level of investment, the input intensity in production, or the degree of specialization. i is a zero mean random variable with unit variance so that, in the absence of formal insurance or informal risk-sharing, the mean and variance of income are simply given by:
The function is assumed twice continuously di¤erentiable with: 0 ( ) 0 and 00 ( ) < 0. This speci…cation represents the basic tradeo¤ between risk and return, which is inherent to agricultural production choices in uncertain environments. Such a tradeo¤ will exist if the farmer's expected income can only increase at the cost of a higher variance. One may argue that some technologies, such as irrigation facilities, allow farmers to simultaneously increase returns while reducing risk. We allow for this possibility as the function ( ) can be interpreted as a technological frontier. A point located strictly below the frontier is ine¢ cient as, at this point, it is possible to reduce the variance without decreasing the mean or to increase the mean without increasing the variance. We then assume that, by choosing his/her level of risk-taking , the farmer always selects a point on the technological frontier ( ). In other words, the mean income is assumed to be maximized for any given variance. We will use = ( 1 ; :::; n ) 2 R n + to denote the risk-taking pro…le in the group. Agricultural production is subject to a series of shocks of di¤erent natures, from drought and pests to illnesses undermining the farmer's ability to work. We draw an important distinction between covariate shocks, such as drought or price shocks, that simultaneously a¤ect all members of the group versus idiosyncratic shocks, such as hail and other very localized weather events or non-epidemic illnesses, that are orthogonal across individuals in the group. From a statistical point of view, it is always possible to decompose a given risk between a covariate, or common, component, which is perfectly correlated within the group, and an idiosyncratic component. This is precisely how our risk structure is framed. We specify the stochastic term as the sum of two independent random variables: i = g + i , with ( g ; i ) 2 R 2 . The covariate risk is embodied by g G. This variable is common to all individuals in the group in the sense that there is a single draw and hence a unique value of g at the group level. In addition, there are n i.i.d. random variables i F representing farmers'idiosyncratic risk. At the group level, the set of all possible vectors of idiosyncratic income shocks is then R n . Let S = ( 1 1 ; :::; n n ) 2 R n denote an element of this set.
the idiosyncratic shock i i . To maintain our assumptions that the total income shock, i , has zero mean and unit variance, we further assume:
so that, indeed, E ( g + i ) = 0 and V ar ( g + i ) = 1, by independence between g and i . The parameter b measures the -constant -idiosyncratic fraction of total risk. When index-insurance is introduced, this parameter will approach the notion of basis risk. Intuitively, (1 b) is the fraction of risk that a farmer may be able to insure via index-insurance, while b de…nes the scope for sharing idiosyncratic risk through the group's IRSA.
We now turn to agents'preferences. Utility is formed over consumption c. The utility function u (c) is increasing and concave and characterized by constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). Making use of Pratt's approximation of the risk premium, the certainty equivalent of consumption,c; can be written as:
where is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. The certainty equivalent highlights the tradeo¤ that individuals face when choosing their level of risk taking. Given our assumptions about technology, under autarky the marginal impact of risk taking on the certainty equivalent is 0 ( ) , so that any increase in expected consumption comes at the cost of higher consumption variability. 2 Evaluating how this tradeo¤ is a¤ected by the presence of informal and formal insurance will be a central focus in the remainder of this paper.
Informal risk-sharing with moral hazard
Due to information asymmetries and high transaction costs, traditional indemnity-based (i.e., named peril) insurance products are unavailable to most farmers in developing countries. Consistent with this observation, we assume that formal insurance and capital markets are missing. Since a fraction b of income variability is uncorrelated across individuals within the group, farmers have an incentive to pool idiosyncratic risk in order to smooth consumption. As amply documented, however, informal risk-sharing is subject to several enforceability constraints and is generally incomplete (Townsend (1994) ; Jalan & Ravallion (1999); Hoogeveen (2002) ; Murgai et al. (2002); Morduch (1995) ). In this section, we provide micro-foundations for this incompleteness in a model with moral hazard in the level of risk taking in production. 3 In the next section, 2 The assumption of CARA preferences does not qualitatively a¤ect our results. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), for instance, the impact of a marginal change in risk-taking would be
The additional term re ‡ects the change in the individual's subjective perception of risk which decreases the marginal cost of risk taking. CARA thus allows a simpli…ed exposition as it eliminates this additional, second order e¤ect which is clearly dominated by the increase in objective risk in any optimal decision on . Moreover, as shown by Clarke (2011) , the shape of demand for index-insurance as a function of risk aversion is similar under CARA and DARA. In the former case, heterogeneity in the degree of absolute risk aversion could serve as a proxy for wealth inequality. 3 The model is based on the analysis developed in Delpierre et al. (2014) .
index-insurance will be introduced to assess its impact on the, initially imperfect, functioning of informal risk-sharing.
The informal risk-sharing setup
We assume that group composition is exogenously given. This is the case if informal risk-sharing takes place at the level of a producers'cooperative, an extended family or a rural community with stable membership.
In addition, we rule out limited commitment as a source of incomplete risk-sharing by assuming that group members can fully commit to make transfers to each other ex post. Instead, we assume that the group is unable to enforce risk-taking . This will generate the moral hazard problem on which we want to focus.
Since the covariate shock is perfectly correlated across group members, the IRSA provides insurance for the idiosyncratic component of risk only. The IRSA speci…es income transfers that are contingent on the realization of shocks S, as follows. A transfer scheme is a vector of transfers T = (t 1 ; :::; t n ) 2 R n , where t i is the net transfer received by farmer i. Let i denote the fraction of his/her own idiosyncratic income shock i i that farmer i transfers to the group and A (S; ) denote the aggregate idiosyncratic shock to be absorbed by the group, so that A (S; ) = P j2N j j j . Note that A (S; ) need not be zero because the group is of …nite size. Indeed non-zero values of A (S; ) represent the source of residual idiosyncratic risk in the presence of informal risk sharing. The net transfer received, t i , is de…ned as the di¤erence between the share of the portion of the aggregate idiosyncratic shock insured by the group that farmer i commits to support, t I i = i A (S; ), and the share of his/her own idiosyncratic shock that he/she transfers to the group,
Homogeneity of group members implies i = j and i = j ; 8 fi; jg N . In the absence of borrowing and savings by the group, the budget constraint requires that P j2N t j = 0; 8S 2 R n . Satisfying the budget constraint with homogeneous members then implies that i = j = 1=n, so that A (S; ) is entirely distributed among group members. As a result, the net transfer received by individual i is:
As can be seen from this expression, a transfer scheme T that satis…es anonymity and the budget constraint has only one degree of freedom, 2 [0; 1], which determines the rate of risk-sharing. Equation (3) has a straightforward interpretation: The net transfer received by farmer i is positive provided his/her idiosyncratic shock is lower than the average shock at the group level. Hence, a farmer facing a negative shock does not always bene…t from a transfer. If, for instance, the average idiosyncratic shock faced by group members is negative, a farmer will be a net contributor if his/her idiosyncratic shock is negative but smaller than the average in absolute value. Farmer i's consumption level is equal to his/her post transfer income, which, using equations (1) and (3) is:
By independence between the di¤erent random variables that appear in (4), we can write the mean and the variance of consumption as:
Recall that, in autarky, consumption variance is simply equal to 2 i . Inspection of expression (6) highlights the distinction between covariate and idiosyncratic risks and the impact of informal risk-sharing on the latter.
The covariate fraction of consumption variance corresponds to the …rst term on the right hand side of (6) and remains unchanged, while the idiosyncratic risk is shared and then reduced. Indeed, the second term pertains to the idiosyncratic fraction of consumption variance and illustrates this e¤ect. The higher is the level of risk-sharing , the lower is this term. The third term shows, which we call "residual" idiosyncratic risk, exists because the IRSA is …nite. Thus even with full risk sharing ( = 1), the IRSA cannot completely eliminate consumption variability due to idiosyncratic risk because the average realization of the idiosyncratic shock in the group will vary from year to year. By the Law of Large Numbers, the average realization converges to zero, so the capacity of the IRSA to absorb idiosyncriatic risk is increasing in group size. The presence of residual idiosyncratic isk in the …nite groups with which we are concerned is crucial because farmer i's consumption variance is now a¤ected by the risk-taking behavior of other farmers in the group through P j2N nfig 2 j . Risk-sharing therefore entails risk externalities that generate moral hazard. In order to highlight this moral hazard issue, we characterize here the …rst best allocation as a benchmark.
The …rst best allocation is de…ned as the rate of risk-sharing and the risk-taking pro…le that maximize welfare in the absence of formal insurance markets. Suppose a social planner is able to enforce and and maximizes the social welfare function W = P i2Nc i ( ; ).
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Proposition 1 First best: In the absence of formal insurance markets, the …rst best allocation is characterized by full risk-sharing F B = 1 and a homogeneous risk-taking pro…le F B = F B ; :::; F B , where the level of risk-taking F B satis…es:
At the …rst best, each individual's consumption variance is equal to V ar c i ; 1;
Proof. The maximization program of the planner is as follows
wherec i ( ; ) can be found by substituting the mean (5) and variance (6) of consumption in the expression of the certainty equivalent (2).
The …rst order condition with respect to any given i requires:
In equation 8, the terms corresponding to i 6 = j represent the risk externality as they give the increase in consumption variance for all other group members resulting from one individual's marginal increase in risk taking. As we shall see shortly, without a social planner to account for this externality, the IRSA induces individuals to take on too much risk. Because farmers are homogeneous in terms of preferences ( ) and technology ( ( )), the implicit function, C i ( ), de…ned by equation 8 is identical for all i 2 N . As a result,
Substituting C ( ) into the planner's objective function gives:
where the farmer's consumption variance from equation (6) becomes
The …rst order condition with respect to then implies:
where @W=@ = 0, by the envelope theorem. Hence,
Therefore, F B = C (1), which gives the condition for F B stated in Proposition 1.
The …rst best can be reached if the risk-taking pro…le is enforceable. The group is then able to internalize the risk externalities highlighted in equation (6). In the absence of moral hazard, the IRSA allows members to fully pool idiosyncratic risk. Yet, even under complete risk-sharing, residual idiosyncratic risk of size 2 b =n 2 (see equation 7) remains, vanishing only asymptotically with group size. Informal insurance thus remains imperfect for two reasons: (1) The group is of …nite size and (2) The IRSA cannot provide insurance against covariate risk. As a result, risk-taking is increasing in group size n and in b, which denotes the extent of the risk that can be covered by the IRSA. Finally, as expected, risk-taking is negatively related to the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion . The condition for …rst best risk-taking tells us that the marginal bene…t of risk-taking, namely the increase in expected returns 0 F B must be equal to the social marginal cost, which is the increase in the risk premium when risk is e¢ ciently shared within the group:
Informal risk-sharing under moral hazard
While some private decisions, such as crop portfolio and …xed investments, are readily observable to other community members, even in tight-knit village settings, neighbors and extended family members are unlikely to observe the full set of actions, including quantity and quality of inputs and labor allocation, that a¤ect production risk. As such, we now make the more realistic assumption that the risk-taking pro…le is unenforceable by the group. As highlighted in the expression for consumption variance (equation 6), the residual idiosyncratic risk that cannot be eliminated even with full risk sharing in IRSA's of …nite group size generates a risk externality. Decisions on are therefore taken individually and in a context of strategic interaction. Under unenforceable risk-taking, the timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1: Group members agree on a rate of risk-sharing .
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Stage 2: Group members simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their own level of risk-taking, i :
The outcome of this game will give us the second best value of .
Using backward induction, we …rst solve the second stage of the game. The following Lemma gives the risk-taking pro…le at the Nash equilibrium, N ( ), as a function of the level of risk-sharing, . The Lemma also compares the Nash level of risk-taking, C ( ), to the cooperative level so as to highlight the moral hazard problem.
Lemma 1 Moral hazard: For any given level of risk-sharing , 1. the risk-taking pro…le at the Nash equilibrium is homogeneous:
2. the Nash level of risk-taking is always larger than the cooperative level and is therefore always ine¢ -ciently high:
Proof. In order to …nd the risk-taking pro…le at the Nash equilibrium N , we derive farmer i's best response function. Let i = ( 1 ; :::; i i ; i+1 ; :::; n ) 2 R n 1 denote the vector of risk-taking levels adopted by all group members with the exception of agent i. Farmer i's optimization problem is as follows
The …rst order condition of this problem gives us
By homogeneity, the optimization problem is identical for all agents. As a result, equation (11) implicitly de…nes the Nash level of risk-taking, N ( ).
The cooperative level of risk-taking, C ( ), is the level that the planner would choose for a given level of risk-sharing, , and therefore corresponds to the function de…ned in equation 9. A simple comparison of conditions (9) and (11) con…rms that C ( ) < N ( ). Indeed, on the left hand side of both equations, we have the same decreasing function of ( 00 < 0), while the right hand side is linearly increasing in , with a higher slope in the case of equation (9). 5 As group members are homogeneous, any cooperative solution concept gives us the same value of .
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. When is chosen non-cooperatively, individuals do not internalize the risk externality; they do not take into consideration the increase in residual idiosyncratic risk, 1 n 2 b, that is transmitted to the rest of the group when they increase their own level of risk taking.
As such, the private marginal cost of risk-taking, which is given by the right hand side of equation (11), is strictly lower that the social marginal cost, given by the right hand side of 9., giving rise to excessive risk-taking.
In order to …nd the rate of risk-sharing that prevails at the second best, we turn to the …rst stage of the game. In stage 1, farmers cooperatively set the level of risk-sharing itself, anticipating that the risk-taking pro…le will be non-cooperatively determined in stage 2. As stated in the following proposition, under moral hazard, risk-sharing is incomplete. 
Proof. The optimization program is
by Lemma 1. The …rst order condition of this problem has the following form:
where
Those expressions are obtained by using equations (2), (5) and (6). Since we evaluate @c=@ at = N ( ),
we can use condition (11), which leads to the above expression. Finally, applying the implicit function theorem on equation (11), we …nd that
The second term on the right hand side of (12) is therefore strictly negative. This implies that the …rst term must be strictly positive for (12) to be satis…ed, which is only possible if is strictly less than one. SB is then found by applying Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 tells us that, at the second best, the rate of risk-sharing is lower than one. As highlighted in Lemma 1, for any given rate of risk-sharing, moral hazard generates excessive risk-taking. The main intuition behind the result of Proposition 1 is that incomplete risk-sharing mitigates moral hazard. More precisely, equation 12 shows that the optimal rate of risk-sharing solves the tradeo¤ between a reduction in idiosyncratic risk and the resulting increase in risk externalities that excessive risk-taking generates. The …rst term on the right hand side gives the direct partial e¤ect of risk-sharing onc. As long as is less than one, this direct e¤ect is positive since, holding risk-taking levels constant, an increase in risk sharing reduces idiosyncratic risk and thus increases expected marginal utility. However, an increase in risk sharing also induces individuals to increase their (non-cooperative) level of risk taking which, because of moral hazard, is excessive. As a result, the indirect e¤ect of a marginal increase in risk sharing is to reduce expected marginal utility. The optimal, cooperatively set level of risk sharing balances these two opposing e¤ects.
A parallel can be drawn between our setup and the Arnott & Stiglitz (1991) 's model. Indeed, in both cases, the equilibrium level of insurance is inferior to the …rst best level because of the presence of moral hazard. In Arnott & Stiglitz (1991) 's model, the partial insurance takes the form of quantity rationing in the formal market. In both cases, o¤ering only partial insurance provides agents with minimal incentives to behave cautiously.
A last point pertaining to the equilibrium level of risk-taking deserves a brief discussion here. An argument based on excessive risk-taking might appear at odds with empirical observations, as farmers in developing countries do not seem to take excessive levels of risk. The point we develop above is that the level of risk-taking should be evaluated conditional on the level of insurance coverage available. While the non-cooperative level of risk taking, N SB , may be low in absolute value, namely lower than the …rst best level
it is at the same time ine¢ ciently high given the insurance coverage o¤ered, SB , by the IRSA. This level, in turn, is restricted both because moral hazard leads to incomplete coverage of idiosyncratic risk and because the IRSA does not insure against covariate risk. The overall level of insurance coverage is thus relatively low, which is consistent with the observation that farmers in poor countries tend to adopt low levels of risk in absolute terms.
Index insurance: Formal insurance against covariate risk
This section describes the index-insurance contract. We adopt a stylized contract that captures the main purpose of index insurance, which is to o¤er coverage against covariate risk. We argue that the interaction between index-insurance and informal risk-sharing highlighted in this paper entirely relies on the ability of formal insurance to reduce covariate risk, not on the particular form taken by the contract. We therefore de…ne the simplest and most e¢ cient way of reducing the covariate variance. More precisely, we make the two following simpli…cations.
The index
First, we assume that the formal insurance provider can observe the realization of g , which will therefore be the index. The main simpli…cation that this assumption implies consists in ruling out basis risk at the group level. In other words, the index perfectly coincides with the realization of the covariate shock of the group.
To …x ideas, one can imagine that g is simply rainfall, that rainfall is uniformly distributed across space, at least within the area where the group is located, and that there is a weather station in this area. Due to the existence of idiosyncratic risk, i , basis risk exists at the individual level, since individual yields are only imperfectly correlated with g . However there is no basis risk at the group level. 
The payout function
Second, we assume the payout, or indemnity, function takes the following form:
where i 2 R + represents the level of coverage. In the following sections, we explore two alternative cases:
(1) individual subscription, where is a farmer's choice variable and (2) group subscription, where is decided by the group. As shown by equation (13), the payout, P , is positive in the case of an adverse shock ( g < 0) and negative otherwise. Full coverage against covariate risk is then obtained for i = i , in which case the payout perfectly o¤sets the covariate shock i g . In addition, we assume that the farmer pays a linear premium, i , in every state of the world. Since the expected payout is zero (E (P ) = 0), the contract will be actuarially fair if and only if = 0.
While such a contractual form is the most e¢ cient in terms of variance reduction, it is not observed in practice. Instead, the payout function of index insurance contracts typically takes the following form:
where~ g is a strike point, generally negative, below which an indemnity payment is made. A premium is then paid independently of g . Our speci…cation instead implies that: (1) the strike point, g , is equal to zero; (2) the premium is paid only in cases of positive covariate shocks and; (3) the premium is proportional to the size of the shock (the premium is i g ). Our speci…cation therefore completely smooths income over both negative and positive values of g and is thus more e¢ cient in terms of variance reduction. In practice, however, transaction costs and limited enforceability limit the feasibility of this type of contract. Fixed costs associated with indemnity payments create incentives to reduce the frequency of payouts by restricting them to cases when they are most valuable to the farmer, namely to relatively large adverse shocks ~ g < 0 .
Enforceability problems relate to the timing of the payment of premiums and indemnities. In our scheme, the value of the premium (cases where g > 0) depends on the realization of the index, and its payment can therefore only take place ex post. While ex ante, before uncertainty is realized, farmers should be willing to pay the premium; ex post, the payment will be subject to commitment problems (ex post moral hazard).
With these caveats, we assume that the payout function de…ned by equation (13) is enforceable so that we can concentrate on the covariate variance reduction that index-insurance may provide.
Taken together, our two assumptions, on the index and the payout function, tend to overestimate the performance of index-insurance as a protection against risk at the group level. The interaction e¤ects highlighted in this paper are therefore, themselves, overestimated as compared to real-life situations.
6 To make our framework closer to reality, we could have assumed the existence of a third source of risk. Let us brie ‡y describe this alternative setting. Suppose that the index is measured at a larger geographical scale. Maintaining the assumption that the index perfectly matches the variable g , we need a new random variable to capture the divergence between the covariate shock of the group and the index. To this end, a random variable c, independent to the (n + 1) others, could have denoted a group speci…c shock. With our assumption, we then abstract from this third source of risk (basis risk at the group level).
Neglecting it does not a¤ect our results. Indeed, perfect income smoothing cannot be achieved, even in our simpli…ed setting.
Complete coverage against covariate risk is technically feasible, but the …nite size of the group will prevent farmers from being perfectly insured against idiosyncratic risk.
Demand for index insurance
We now turn to the demand for the index insurance contract described above. First, consider how a farmer's level of consumption is a¤ected by the introduction of this contract. For a given levels of index insurance coverage, , and risk-sharing, , and a risk-taking pro…le, , consumption becomes:
where the superscript II stands for Index-Insurance. Consumption with index insurance then has the following mean and variance:
V ar c
In the absence of index-insurance, the covariate variance was simply
. Equation (15) shows that it becomes
(1 b) with index-insurance. Let ( i ) denote the variance reduction from index insurance. It is straightforward to show that:
This condition states that index-insurance reduces consumption variance provided the farmer's level of risk taking, i , is su¢ ciently high. This result is consistent with the work of Miranda (1991) on area-yield crop insurance. To understand this condition, it is useful to re-write equation ( This implies that
This decomposition of ( i ) highlights that the payout is itself stochastic with a variance of 2 (1 b). As a result, index-insurance is an additional source of risk. This risk is useful as it countervails the variability of income. The covariance between, c i , the farmer's consumption in the absence of index insurance, and the payout is indeed negative. The bene…t derived from this risk countervailing e¤ect is higher than the cost imposed by the additional risk only provided i is su¢ ciently high. It can be seen that the covariance is linearly increasing in i . The demand for index-insurance will therefore be increasing in the farmer's own level of risk taking, i .
The following proposition describes the demand for index insurance in the case of individual subscription. Let II denote the equilibrium level of risk-taking when demand for index-insurance is interior.
7 See Appendix 1. 8 See Appendix 1.
where II is the equilibrium level of risk-taking when demand for index-insurance is interior.
1. Under cooperative risk-taking, II = C II ( ), which is given by
2. Under non-cooperative risk-taking, II = N II ( ), which is given by
Proof. Provided in Appendix 2.
Proposition 3 Under individual subscription, the demand for index insurance, i , is:
1. decreasing in the premium :
2. decreasing in b, the fraction of idiosyncratic risk in total risk:
3. hump-shaped in the coe¢ cient of absolute risk-aversion, , with
Proof. The three results in Proposition 3 derive from Lemma 2 and the application of the implicit function theorem on equations (18) and (19).
The …rst result states that, as expected, demand for index-insurance decreases with the premium charged by the provider. The second and third results are consistent with the work of Clarke (2011) . The second result states that demand decreases with b, which represents basis risk, or the fraction of idiosyncratic risk over total risk, which the index is unable to insure. The third results, that demand is hump-shaped in absolute risk aversion and that neither risk-neutral nor in…nitely risk-averse agents purchase any index-insurance, is less obvious. Decomposing the e¤ect of risk aversion on demand provides intuition. When demand is interior:
On one hand, the direct partial e¤ect of risk-aversion on demand for index-insurance is positive since, holding constant informal risk sharing and risk taking, willingness to pay for insurance increases with risk-aversion.
On the other hand, as noted above (see also Miranda (1991) ), the bene…t of index-insurance is increasing in the agent's level of risk-taking, . Since risk-taking is itself decreasing in risk-aversion, in…nitely riskaverse agents opt for = 0 and do not subscribe. With exogenous risk-taking, demand would instead be monotonically increasing in risk-aversion. Proposition 3 thus demonstrates the importance of treating risk-taking as endogenous.
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We are now set to explore the e¤ects that the introduction of a formal index-insurance contract might have on a pre-existing risk-sharing network. Our focus will be twofold. First, we analyze whether index-insurance has the potential to either crowd in or crowd out informal risk-sharing. In terms of our framework, where the composition of the informal risk sharing group is exogenous, we will focus on the potential impact of the introduction of index insurance on the equilibrium rate of risk-sharing, . Second, we examine welfare implications.
The impact of index-insurance on …rst best informal risk-sharing
Before turning to the case of moral hazard, we present the impact of index-insurance on the …rst best IRSA as a benchmark. The following proposition characterizes the impact of index-insurance on risk-sharing, risk-taking and welfare in the absence of moral hazard. The initial situation (absence of index insurance) is therefore given by Proposition 1. In addition, the social planner is assumed to be able to enforce individual demand for index-insurance i . The …rst best level of risk-sharing and risk-taking when index-insurance is available to farmers are denoted by 
Proposition 4 The impact of index-insurance on …rst best outcomes: If risk-taking is enforceable
by the group, then:
1. The rate of risk-sharing is una¤ ected by the presence of index-insurance: 
Individual demand for index-insurance is homogeneous,

The introduction of index-insurance increases welfare if the premium is low ( F B (1 b)).
Over this premium range farmers' level of expected utility is a decreasing function of the premium:
Proof. Provided in Appendix 3.
At the …rst best IRSA, risk-sharing is complete F B = 1 . This proposition …rst points out that this remains true with index-insurance. Moral hazard is therefore the source of the crowding out e¤ect that we highlight in the case of individual subscription.
Second, we see that, in the absence of moral hazard, index-insurance cannot reduce welfare. Moreover, the impact on welfare is strictly positive, provided the insurance premium is low enough. This benchmark case is directly related to Arnott & Stiglitz (1991) 's paper, where a formal insurance market can be supplemented by informal risk-sharing. They show that if agents can perfectly monitor each other to enforce the cooperative level of risk-taking, then informal risk-sharing improves welfare. This statement simply needs to be reversed in this paper; namely, in our case, it is the introduction of formal insurance that increases welfare if informal risk-sharing is not impeded by moral hazard.
Finally, it should be noted that the …rst best can be achieved even if is unenforceable. In other words, as soon as the risk-taking pro…le is enforceable by the group, non-cooperative subscription to index-insurance does not entail e¢ ciency losses.
9
The remainder of this section is devoted to the case of moral hazard under individual versus group contracts. The following subsection tackles the case of individual subscription to index-insurance, while the subsequent one explores the case of group subscription.
The impact of index-insurance on second best informal risk-sharing: The case of individual subscription
We now analyze the impact of the introduction of index-insurance under moral hazard. Assume then that the risk-taking pro…le is unenforceable by the group and that an index-insurance contract is o¤ered to farmers on an individual basis. We assume that all farmers in the group have access to the index-insurance contract.
In order to highlight the main e¤ect of this model, we assume from now on that 000 ( ) = 0.
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Since we are dealing with the moral hazard case, the initial equilibrium, in the absence of index insurance, is described by Proposition 2. Recall, in particular, that equilibrium risk-sharing is, in this case, incomplete ( SB < 1). The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The group members agree on a rate of risk-sharing .
2. Each member simultaneously and non-cooperatively chooses his/her risk-taking level, i , and his/her level of index-insurance coverage, i .
We denote by SB II the second best level of risk-sharing when index-insurance is available to farmers. The following proposition describes the e¤ect of index-insurance on risk-sharing under moral hazard. and the demand for index-insurance is equal to zero: i = 0; 8i 2 N , 9 As shown in Appendix 3, the planner solution is identical to the individual decision on as described by Lemma 2. 1 0 Assuming that 000 ( ) = 0 amounts to making a second order approximation of the relationship between risk and return.
This allows to get rid of higher order e¤ects and to focus on the main result of this paper. The interested reader can refer to Appendix 5, where this assumption is relaxed. and where II solves
Proof. Provided in Appendix 4.
This proposition states that the rate of informal risk-sharing is negatively impacted by the introduction of an index-insurance contract if the latter is o¤ered at the individual level. The extent of the crowding out e¤ect depends on the value of the index-insurance premium and hence on the resulting level of subscription adopted by the group members.
Proposition 5 highlights three potential situations. We start by providing intuitions for cases 1 and 3, where the crowding out e¤ect is either absent (1) or complete (3) and turn to the intermediate case (2) afterwards.
Case 1 pertains to a range of prices at which the rate of informal risk-sharing is una¤ected and where there is no demand for index-insurance. The intuition behind this case is simply that the availability of indexinsurance at prohibitive prices is conceptually equivalent to the absence of index-insurance. The second best allocation without index-insurance therefore prevails in this case.
Case 3 is of particular interest as it describes situations where informal risk-sharing coexists with a positive subscription to formal index-insurance. Under moral hazard, we show that when subscription to index-insurance becomes positive, risk-sharing necessarily drops to a rate of II , which is strictly below the initial rate of SB . At …rst sight, the interaction between formal and informal insurance is unclear.
Indeed, index-insurance o¤ers protection against covariate risk, while informal risk-sharing only pertains to idiosyncratic risk. As covariate and idiosyncratic risks are independent, adverse e¤ects of index-insurance on IRSA's are unexpected. The mechanism proceeds as follows. If the index-insurance coverage is freely chosen by farmers, then they can adapt it to their risk-taking level. Recall that the marginal cost of risk-taking consists of the increase in covariate and in idiosyncratic risks. Lemma 2 shows that the demand for indexinsurance increases linearly with . More precisely, when increases by one unit, also increases by one unit. 11 It follows that, at the margin, farmers are fully covered against covariate risk, even when subscription is incomplete ( < N II ( II )). In other words, the fraction of the marginal cost of risk-taking pertaining to covariate risk vanishes. This has an in ‡uence not only on the equilibrium level of risk-taking but also on the responsiveness of risk-taking to risk-sharing, which is at the hart of the moral hazard problem. Appendix 4
shows that risk-taking is more responsive to risk-sharing when the demand for index-insurance in interior:
1 1 This linearity is due to our assumption of constant absolute risk-aversion. Relaxing this assumption would complexify the relationship between and , but would not alter our results. Indeed, even if @ =@ < 1, it would still be positive (higher risk-taking should always entail higher subscription to index-insurance). It follows that the covariate part of the marginal cost of risk-taking is reduced. Risk-taking is then more responsive to risk-sharing and the moral hazard problem worsens.
The optimality condition for risk-sharing has the following form (see Appendix 4):
This condition states that the marginal bene…t of risk-sharing (@c II =@ ) should o¤set its marginal cost which consists of an increase in the mutual externalities of risk. The externalities are of a larger extent because a higher rate of risk-sharing induces agents to take more risk (@ =@ > 0). Fundamentally, the presence of index-insurance increases farmers'responsiveness to risk-sharing, thereby increasing the marginal cost of risk-sharing at the group level. The moral hazard issue is more severe and the second best rate of risk-sharing is consequently lower. It is important to note that this crowding out e¤ect is totally independent of the extent of index insurance coverage. Put di¤erently, index-insurance crowds out informal risk-sharing, even if is arbitrarily close to zero. The reduction in is indeed not due to a higher level of risk-taking. Instead, e¤ects on incentives are acting at the margin. As attested by the following proposition, risk-taking might even decrease after the introduction of index-insurance. It should also be noted that, if is strictly lower than~ 2 , then the index coverage is positive but close to zero and falls. The overall level of protection against risk is, in this case, unambiguously lower. Implications for welfare are analyzed below.
Finally Case 2 is remarkable and deserves further explanations. If the value of is intermediate, namely
if it belongs to the interval [~ 1 ;~ 2 ), then the availability of index-insurance causes a reduction in informal risk-sharing (~ < SB ), even though is equal to zero. We can provide an intuition for this case as follows.
Recall that is determined cooperatively at the …rst stage of the game. The group therefore chooses so as to maximize social welfare. Suppose that is initially equal to its second best level without indexinsurance SB . Suppose further that index-insurance is o¤ered to farmers at a price 2 [~ 1 ;~ 2 ). If remained unchanged, then farmers'subscription to index-insurance would be interior since~ 2 is the farmers' willingness to pay for the …st unit of when = SB . However, this situation would not be optimal. Indeed, as we saw in case 3, the group should reduce its level of risk-sharing when is interior. If it did so and set it equal to II < SB , then would be at a corner because the farmers'willingness to pay for the …st unit of when = II is only~ 1 , the reason being that the equilibrium level of risk-taking is lower under = II than under = SB . This situation would not be optimal either because would be too low for a situation where equals zero. The group therefore adopts the level of risk-sharing such that is interior, but just equal to zero.
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of index-insurance on risk-taking.
Proposition 6
The impact of index-insurance on risk-taking under individual subscription: If risk-taking is unenforceable by the group, three cases may occur depending on the value of the premium . 4. Therefore, SB II reaches a minimum at =~ 1 .
Proof. In case 1, Proposition 5 tells us that is at a corner. The second best allocation is then una¤ected by index-insurance.
In case 2, we know by Proposition 5 that = 0 and that SB II is lower than its second best level without index-insurance SB . Risk-taking increases with both and , which provide insurance and decrease the marginal cost of risk-sharing. Therefore, in this case, SB II < SB . The impact of on the equilibrium level of risk-taking writes d
where the function
is given by equation (25) In case 3, on the one hand, the rate of risk-sharing remains constant over the range [0;~ 1 ), hence
On the other hand, is interior and @ =@ < 0 (see equation 17). As a result, d SB II =d < 0. Finally, point 4 is a direct corollary of points 2 and 3.
Proposition 6 tells us that the equilibrium level of risk-taking reacts non-monotonically to the value of the premium . If index-insurance is prohibitively costly, namely when 2 [~ 2 ; +1), risk-taking is une¤acted by the availability of the formal contract. When is lower than~ 2 , two types of e¤ects are at play. On the one hand, the crowding out e¤ect reduces the rate of risk-sharing, thereby decreasing the level of risk taken by farmers. On the other hand, when 2 [0;~ 1 ), subscription to index-insurance becomes interior and starts increasing as decreases. This provides farmers with coverage against covariate shocks and leads them to increase risk-taking. The main lesson to be drawn from this proposition is that risk-taking reaches a minimum precisely at the point where becomes interior. Therefore, if index-insurance is o¤ered to farmers with the aim of increasing their expected pro…ts by stimulating risk-taking, attention has to be paid to the pricing policy: If o¤ered on an individual basis, index-insurance can only stimulate risk-taking if subscription is large enough so as to compensate for the crowding out e¤ect.
Welfare e¤ects follow the same logic as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 7
The impact of index-insurance on welfare under individual subscription: If risktaking is unenforceable by the group, then the introduction of index-insurance decreases welfare if the premium is too high:
Proof. Provided in Appendix 6.
The introduction of index-insurance might reduce welfare. We highlight two simple conditions for this unintended outcome to occur. First, index insurance must be o¤ered on an individual basis so that individual farmers, instead of the group, decide on the level of coverage. Second, the premium must be su¢ ciently high (i.e., actuarially unfair). To illustrate this point, consider the situation in which the index coverage is initially interior, but just equal to zero ( =~ 1 ). We then show that a marginal decrease in reduces expected utility. As the following equation illustrates, the marginal impact of on expected utility is twofold:
On the one hand, the direct partial e¤ect of onc II is negative (positive) and simply corresponds to the increase (decrease) in the price paid for each unit of coverage. On the other hand, the equilibrium level of risk-taking is a decreasing function of the premium . 13 Also, because of moral hazard, we know that the equilibrium level of risk-taking is excessive: @c II =@ < 0. If decreases at the margin, then the direct e¤ect on welfare is positive and the indirect e¤ect (through SB II ) negative. One can immediately see that the former e¤ect will be dominated by the latter if is small, namely when is only slightly lower than~ 1 .
The impact of index-insurance on second best informal risk-sharing: The case of group subscription
Finally, we turn to the case of group subscription. Suppose that the index-insurance contract is o¤ered to the group. The timing of the gamehas to be modi…ed as follows:
1. The group members agree on a rate of risk-sharing and on a coverage level .
2. They simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide on their risk-taking level i .
Let the superscript G stand for group subscription.
Proposition 8 The impact of index-insurance on second best IRSA under group subscription.
If risk-taking is unenforceable by the group, then 1. Unless o¤ ered at actuarially favorable prices, group subscription to index-insurance is always incomplete in equilibrium:
2. The introduction of index-insurance is always welfare improving under group subscription.
Proof. Provided in Appendix 7.
Subscription by the group is always incomplete but also always welfare enhancing. The intuition behind those two key results proceeds as follows: in the case of group subscription, the moral hazard e¤ect of index-insurance is internalized by the group. In order to mitigate moral hazard, the group adopts a lower coverage level as compared to what an individual would have chosen, for any given level of the premium.
In particular, if the contract is actuarially fair, group subscription remains incomplete. This result may contribute to explaining the low take-ups that are generally observed empirically. With group subscription, index-insurance is welfare-enhancing, whatever the level of the premium. To understand the latter result, one should simply notice that the coverage level is chosen by the group in stage 1 so as to maximize social welfare. As explained above, by opting for incomplete subscription, the group takes into account the moral hazard e¤ect of insurance. The optimization on follows therefore the same logic than the choice of and both the index-insurance coverage and the rate of informal risk-sharing are incomplete and a¤ected by the same tradeo¤ between the provision of insurance coverage and the production of reciprocal risk externalities through the IRSA.
Concluding Remarks
Farmers in developing countries are exposed to a series of shocks of di¤erent natures. With missing credit and insurance markets, rural households mainly rely on informal risk-sharing arrangements (IRSA's) to smooth consumption. The ability of IRSA's to mitigate risk is limited, however, by two constraints. First, IRSA's are themselves subject to important information and commitment constraints that reduce their capacity to mitigate idiosyncratic risk. Second, they do not o¤er any protection against common, or covariate, shocks.
In this context, the development of index-insurance programs, whose primary target is precisely the types of covariate risks originating in certain types of weather shocks such as droughts, is held up as a highly promising means of enhancing farmers'welfare. In addition, since the types of shocks that IRSA's and index-insurance are designed to protect against are orthogonal, we might expect minimal interaction between the two types of insurance schemes.
We have shown, however, that if informal risk-sharing su¤ers from moral hazard, then the introduction of index-insurance contracts at the individual level may indeed introduce an interaction between the two schemes that results in the crowding out of informal risk-sharing. The reason is that index-insurance reduces the marginal cost of risk-taking, and thereby exacerbates the moral hazard problem faced by the IRSA. In response, the group will endogenously reduce the amount of idiosyncratic risk sharing and, for certain ranges of the index insurance premium, this may actually reduce farmer welfare relative to a no-insurance world.
This moral hazard e¤ect will be o¤set if index-insurance proves su¢ ciently bene…cial in terms of coverage.
This will be the case if the premium charged by the provider is su¢ ciently low. Fortunately, adverse e¤ects on welfare are not entirely robust to changes in the contractual form. In particular, if index-insurance is o¤ered at the group level, then its impact on risk-taking is properly internalized by the group and welfare e¤ects are always positive.
Finally, we identify limitations of and potential extension to this model. First, the crowding out result depends critically on the presence of moral hazard in the IRSA. If the imperfection instead originates from commitment constraints, contrasting predictions can be derived. For example, suppose that risk-taking is contractible (no moral hazard) but that informal insurance transfers are subject to ex-post commitment constraints. Suppose also that the group can sanction defaulters by excluding them from future participation in the IRSA. In this context, group members evaluate the cost of the insurance transfer they are supposed to make against the bene…t of continued group membership. In the case of a cooperative, this bene…t not only includes informal insurance but also other bene…ts associated with membership such as access to credit and preferential input and output prices. Assume now that index-insurance is o¤ered at the group level. In such a context, index-insurance may crowd in informal risk-sharing as the value of group membership is enhanced, which tends to relax the incentive compatibility condition and may increase the rate of informal risk-sharing.
However, risk-taking seems di¢ cult to enforce in practice and moral hazard may still prove relevant, even if combined with limited commitment in reality.
Second, the moral hazard e¤ect of index-insurance that our model highlights is actually attributable to the fact that agents are allowed to choose their subscription level at the margin. This is indeed what generates the e¤ect on the marginal cost of risk-taking. Therefore, a take it or leave it insurance o¤er would solve the issue. However, information asymmetries may prevent policy-makers from …nding the appropriate rate of coverage. The solution would then be to delegate this task to agents that are better informed, such as the group itself. This observation o¤ers another interpretation of our recommendation that group subscription should be favored.
Third and …nally, an important limitation of our framework is that only homogeneous groups are considered. While we do not expect important changes to occur in the case of individual subscription, the impact of group heterogeneity under group subscription deserves attention. Indeed, if a single subscription level is adopted at the group level, it is unlikely to be optimal for every member. Welfare e¤ects should then be carefully analyzed. A …nal issue that our paper does not address is: what if the two groups, namely the informal risk-sharing network and the set of agents to whom index insurance is o¤ered, do not coincide?
Those two considerations remain for future research.
7 Appendix 1: Index-insurance and the income variance
The consumption variance with index insurance can be written as
Therefore,
Let us reproduce here the expression of consumption without index insurance:
Since E (P ) = 0, the covariance between Y i and the P is equal to E (Y i ; P ). Denoting by F j the distribution function of j ; 8j 2 N and by G the distribution function of g and making use of the expression of the payout (13), one obtains
By independence between g and the j 's and the fact that E ( g ) = 0, this expression reduces to
Therefore, substituting for V ar (P ) =~ 2 (1 b) and Cov (c i ; P ) (equation 21) in (20), we …nd that ( i ) > 0 if and only if i >~ =2.
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2
The individual demand for index-insurance can be found by solving the following optimization problem:
The …rst order condition with respect to writes
Rearranging, we obtain expressions (16) and (17).
We now need to …nd the level of risk-taking II that agents adopt when they bene…t from index-insurance under cooperative and non-cooperative risk-taking, respectively.
Under cooperative risk-taking, Proposition 1 applies and the level of risk-taking is homogeneous: i = ; 8i 2 N . We maximizec II i (equation 22) with respect to . The …rst order condition imposes that Under non-cooperative risk-taking, agents maximizec II i (equation 22) with respect to their own level of risk-taking i , while considering the others'( j ; j 6 = i) as given. Taking the …rst order condition with respect to i , we …nd
Substituting for o (17), we end up with equation (19).
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 4
When and are enforceable and because the group is homogeneous, the planner chooses homogeneous levels of risk-taking and of index-insurance coverage and a rate of risk-sharing so as to maximize u c II and hencec II (equation 22). As compared to the …rst best in the absence of index-insurance, the …rst order condition with respect to is unchanged and imposes that @V ar c II ; ; ;
The envelope theorem allows us to integrate this result in the objective function before maximizingc II with respect to and :
The …rst order condition with respect to is then identical to condition (24). The index-insurance coverage is therefore interior if and only if
otherwise it is at a corner.
In case of corner index-insurance coverage, the …rst best level of risk-taking is given by
(See the proof of Proposition 1).
In case of an interior index-insurance coverage, the …rst best level of risk-taking is equal to (9),
Making use of equation (18), we have that
In the neighborhood of the threshold, condition (26) is satis…ed with equality. Substituting for =~ =
(1 b) in the latter equation (28), we …nd that equations (27) and (28) are identical. There is therefore no discontinuity in risk-taking, so that the threshold is unique.
This lead to the conclusion that if > F B (1 b), then = 0 and 
Solving the game with index-insurance
In order to show the crowding out result, we solve the game in the case where index-insurance is available.
The timing is as follows. In stage (1), the rate of risk-sharing is de…ned cooperatively at the group level.
In stage (2), agents choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively and .
Solving stage 2:
Using backward induction, we solve the second stage for any given level of . The demand for indexinsurance and the equilibrium level of risk-taking are given by Lemma 2. can be either at a corner or interior, depending on the value of . To see this, we reproduce here equation (16), which tells us that
By an application of the implicit function theorem on equation (19), we know that @ N II =@ > 0. Therefore there exists a threshold value of , which we denote by~ such that o (~ ) = 0. If alpha is higher than~ , then is interior and equilibrium risk-taking is given by N II ( ) as de…ned by equation (19), otherwise is at a corner and equilibrium risk-taking equals N ( ), which is given by equation (11). For notational convenience, let us de…ne ( ) as follows
Solving stage 1:
Turning to stage (1), we solve the collective decision-making problem and select the optimal value of .
The objective function is given bỹ
Before analyzing the …rst order condition of this problem, we need to highlight that the non-negativity constraint on creates a discontinuity of the …rst derivative ofc II with respect to . The generic expression of this …rst derivative is as follows
by equation (25) . The third term of (30) 
To …nd the expression of @ =@ , we need to distinguish between two cases:
Applying the implicit function theorem on (11) and (19), respectively, we …nd that
Hence,~ is a point of discontinuity of the …rst derivative ofc II with respect to . Indeed, the latter equations show that
which implies that
As a consequence of this discontinuity, three cases need to be distinguished for optimization. Combining (31) and (32), we obtain that arg max c II = , where is such that
Notice that = SB , which is given by Proposition 2.
We also have that II < . This can be seen by comparing equations (33) and (34). Indeed, one can rewrite condition (34) as where @ =@x > 0 and @ =@ < 0 at any interior solution, by the second order condition with respect to .
The optimal value of therefore depends on the value of the threshold~ : 
Comparative statics with respect to
We now analyze the impact of the insurance premium on the rate of risk-sharing . As a preliminary remark, notice that (condition 34) and II (condition 33) do not depend on , neither directly, nor indirectly through , which does not appear in (33) and (34) because 000 = 0, by assumption.
However, the threshold value~ is a¤ected by in the following way: by de…nition of~ 11 Appendix 5: Relaxing the assumption that 000 = 0
If we relax the assumption that 000 = 0, we obtain an additional e¤ect by which the rate of risk-sharing decreases when decreases. This additional e¤ect takes place when is interior. In this situation, 
The crowding out e¤ect would be reinforced under this condition.
Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 7
The functionc 
Appendix 7: Proof of Proposition 8
We solve the game in the case where subscription to index-insurance is chosen by the group along with the rate of risk-sharing . The timing is as follows. In stage (1), and are de…ned cooperatively at the group level. In stage (2), agents choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively .
Solving stage 2:
Using backward induction, we solve the second stage for any given level of and . The Nash level of risk-taking in the case of group subscription N G can be found by solving the following optimization problem: Individual farmers maximize the certainty equivalent of consumption (2), where the expressions of the mean and variance of consumption are given by (14) and (15) The …rst order conditions of this problem are given by:
Under moral hazard, we know that the non-cooperative level of risk-taking is excessive (see Lemma 1). It In particular, if index-insurance is actuarially fair ( = 0), then subscription remains incomplete: < N G . The second point of the proposition states that index-insurance is always welfare enhancing under group subscription. This is simply due to the structure of the game where both and are selected by the group in period 1 so as to maximize social welfare, by de…nition.
